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INTRODUCTION
In the context of the "hanging paragraph" of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a), recent bankruptcy decisions have reached varying conclu-
sions regarding whether a "purchase-money security interest" (PMSI)
t B.M.E., University of Kansas, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2010; Re-
search Assistant for Professor Robert S. Summers; General Editor, Cornell Law Review. The
author would like to thank his family, Professor Summers, and Amanda Howard for their
unending support, advice, and care.
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secures the portion of a retail automotive loan attributable to paying
off the borrower's negative equity in a trade-in vehicle. On this issue,
several circuit courts' and the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel2 have ruled, the Second Circuit is currently hearing a case, 3 and
the lower courts have decided numerous cases.4 This Note will pro-
vide a comprehensive survey of the positions of various courts and a
critique and analysis of those positions and will argue for a legislative
solution to the problem.
This question arose because of changes in the bankruptcy law en-
acted by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Prior to 2005, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case, if a secured claim exceeded the value of collateral, the Bank-
ruptcy Code treated any shortfalls as unsecured. 5 This treatment
meant that debtors could "cram-down" the secured portion of claims
to the value of the collateral with the remainder being treated as un-
secured. 6 While debtors had to pay the secured portion in full, they
received a discharge for the unpaid portion at the end of the plan.7
This occurred most frequently with automobile loans because the ve-
hicles were often worth less than the remaining obligation.8 The dif-
ference in values increased when lenders rolled negative equity from
trade-in vehicles into the new loans.
The BAPCPA changed those rules by adding the so-called "hang-
ing paragraph" to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 9 This section is called the
"hanging paragraph" because, although it appears at the end of
§ 1325(a), it is not numbered and is not directly connected to the
previous numbered paragraph, which is 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9).10
The hanging paragraph essentially gives covered lenders secured
See, e.g., In re Callicott, No. 09-1030, 2009 WL 2870501 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009); In re
Mierkowski, No. 08-3866, 2009 WIL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re Dale, No. 08-
20583, 2009 WL 2857998 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re
Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295 (1]th Cir. 2008).
2 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2008).
3 See Reiber v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177 (2d
Cir. 2008), certifying question to In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WL 1766000
(N.Y. June 24, 2009). The Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York
Court of Appeals: "Is the portion of an automobile retail instalment [sic] sale attributable
to a trade-in vehicle's 'negative equity' a part of the 'purchase-money obligation' arising
from the purchase of a new car, as defined under NewYork's U.C.C.?" Id. at 186. The New
York Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 split decision, answered this question in the affirmative. See
In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WIL 1766000, (N.Y. June 24, 2009).
4 See infra Parts II and III.
5 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
6 See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 839-42 (discussing the relevance of purchase-money status).
7 Id. at 840.
8 Id.
9 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
10 Penrod, 392 B.R. at 840-41.
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claims for the entire amounts of the loans." This paragraph is impor-
tant because a Chapter 13 debtor must provide for payment in full of
all secured claims instead of providing for payment of only the value
of the collateral. 12 Therefore, whether a claim qualified for treatment
under the hanging paragraph became a key question.
For a creditor to qualify for the protections of the hanging para-
graph on motor vehicle 13 loans, a debtor must have incurred the obli-
gation within 910 days of filing the petition and the vehicle must have
been for the debtor's personal use.' 4 For collateral consisting of
"other thing[s] of value," the debtor must have incurred the obliga-
tion within the preceding year. 15 Finally, regardless of the type of col-
lateral, the creditor's security interest must be a PMSI. 16 The vast
majority of courts have held that the BAPCPA refers to state law found
in U.C.C. § 9-103.17 "Purchase-money security interest" in a consumer
good is a term that originated in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), although the treatment of such interests is much like pre-
Code law.' 8
When applying the U.C.C. definition, identification of a PMSI is
usually easy. A typical example is a seller of goods retaining an inter-
est in those goods to secure the payment of all or some of the price of
those goods.' 9 Third-party lenders can also retain a PMSI in a con-
sumer good. This occurs when they make advances or incur obliga-
tions "to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the
collateral" where those advances or obligations are "in fact so used" to
acquire rights in that collateral.20
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest in
goods has purchase-money status "to the extent that the goods are
purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest."
21
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (excluding loans meeting the hanging paragraph's require-
ments from the operation of 11 U.S.C. § 506, the provision that previously allowed the
cram-down" of all secured loans in Chapter 13).
12 Id. § 1325(a) (5).
13 "Motor vehicle" is defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102. Id. § 1325(a); see 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102 (a) (6) (2006) (defining "motor vehicle" as "a vehicle driven or drawn by mechani-
cal power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, [not
including] a vehicle operated only on a rail line").
14 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., In re Austin, 381 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008) (holding that a PMSI
secured negative equity); In reJohnson, 380 B.R. 236 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007).
18 See, e.g., 4JAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 31-
6(a) (5th ed. 2002) (discussing treatment of such interests both under the U.C.C. and pre-
Code).
19 Id.
20 U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2) (2006).
21 Id. § 9-103(b) (1).
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"Purchase-money collateral" means "goods . . . that secure[ ] a
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.
'22
A "purchase-money obligation" is "an obligation ... incurred as all or
part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in
fact so used."23 Banks making loans give value that allows the debtor
to acquire rights in the vehicle to qualify for purchase-money status.
Loans that contain negative equity, which generally fall in the
third-party-lender category, are more difficult. There are questions of
whether the negative equity is "part of the price" or if it "enable[d]
the debtor to acquire rights."24 In addition to these questions, courts
have also disagreed on whether negative equity transforms an entire
security interest into a non-purchase-money interest (applying the so-
called "transformation" rule25) or whether both purchase-money and
non-purchase-money security interests secure such loans (the so-called
"dual-status" rule).26
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio intro-
duced an interesting federalism question when it held that, for pur-
poses of the hanging paragraph, PMSI had a federal common-law
definition and a PMSI did not secure negative equity.27 Judge Russ
Kendig reasoned that, although the term originated in the Uniform
Commercial Code, Congress did not specify that state law must apply
for the definition and that this omission left interpretation of the term
open to the federal judiciary.28 He further reasoned that federal pol-
icy conflicted with the use of state law.29 The federal bankruptcy pol-
icy of providing uniform treatment was failing, and there was no state
interest in having the U.C.C. definition apply based on the U.C.C.'s
comments disavowing its application to bankruptcy law.3 0 Although a
number of courts have cited the Ohio decision, to date, no court has
followed by applying a federal definition, thereby continuing the split
in authority.
3 '
22 Id. § 9-103(a) (1).
23 Id. § 9-103(a) (2).
24 Id. § 9-103 (a) (2).
25 E.g., In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), rev'd, 562 F.3d
618 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Cassidy, 362 B.R. 596 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007).
26 E.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2008); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); Citifinancial
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36 (D. Kan. 2007).
27 In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
28 See id. at 216-20.
29 See id. at 217.
30 See id. at 219.
31 See, e.g., In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 830-31 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), affd sub nom. Ford
v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Look, 383
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This split in authority, which the Westfall court characterized as a
"maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions,"3 2 leaves Chapter 13
debtors and creditors with little guidance. Debtors have only uncer-
tain expectations of whether courts will permit negative equity to be
crammed down and they face the increased expense of additional liti-
gation on the question. Creditors, already faced with other difficulties
in valuing subprime automotive loans, encounter added uncertainty
regarding how courts will treat particular loans. The current eco-
nomic climate and the importance of revenues from auto financing to
struggling automotive manufacturers33 give this issue additional
importance.
Part I of this Note will discuss the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the change in the cram-
down rules, and the effects of those changes. Part II will provide a
comprehensive review of the current case law and describe the various
approaches taken by the courts. Part III will discuss the outlier ap-
proach of the Northern District of Ohio. Part IV will analyze the deci-
sions described in Parts II and III, argue that the Ohio Court erred by
applying a federal definition, and finally argue that a federal legisla-
tive solution is both appropriate and desirable.
I
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT, CHANGE IN CRAM-DowN RULES
The Bankruptcy Code generally does not permit secured claims
to exceed the value of the collateral securing the loan.3 4 Section
506(a) (1) provides that a claim is secured by the creditor's interest in
the bankruptcy estate's interest in the collateral.3 5 The valuation stan-
dard for the estate's interest is the "replacement-value" standard,
B.R. 210, 218 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank of Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 139
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In reJohnson 380 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). But see
Penrod, 392 B.R. at 844-46, 856-60 (purporting to apply state law to answer whether a
purchase-money security interest existed and then applying federal law to determine
whether the transformation or dual-status rule should apply).
32 Westfall, 376 B.R. at 213.
33 See Sharon Silke Carty, GMAC, Key to GM's Survival, Gets $5 Billion in Federal Aid;
Goal: Start Lending to 'Broader Group', USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 2008, at 3B (characterizing
GMAC as "GM's crown jewel"; noting that GMAC regularly outearned automotive opera-
tions for years; and providing the example that in 2006, a year in which GM's auto opera-
tions lost $3.2 billion, "GMAC pulled in $2.2 billion").
34 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1) (2006) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property... and is an unsecured





which sets the value at what the debtor would have to pay for compa-
rable property.3 6 Because the estate's interest in the collateral is lim-
ited to the replacement value of the collateral, the creditor's interest
limited to the estate's interest thus cannot exceed the value of that
collateral. To the extent that a claim is greater than the creditor's
interest, the Bankruptcy Code treats the claim as unsecured. 37 The
result is the bifurcation of the creditor's claim into secured and un-
secured portions.
Prior to passing of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act, this bifurcation of the creditor's claim enabled
Chapter 13 debtors to "cram-down" claims. A Chapter 13 plan's treat-
ment of a secured claim could be confirmed if either the secured
creditor accepted the plan, the debtor surrendered the collateral to
the creditor, or the debtor chose to retain the collateral and exercised
the 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5)(B) "cram-down" power.38 This power
would reduce the secured portion of the loan to the value of the col-
lateral, with the remainder becoming unsecured. 39 This was of special
importance, because while the Chapter 13 plans were required to pro-
vide for payment of secured claims in full over the life of the plan, the
court would discharge the remaining unsecured balance. 40
These provisions were particularly important in the context of au-
tomotive loans. Automotive loans are often "upside down," meaning
that the value of the car securing the loan is less than the amount
owed. The very nature of automobiles contributes to this problem
because they tend to depreciate and lose market value quickly.
41
Lending practices-such as six- and seven-year loan periods, zero-
down loans, and high financing charges-have also contributed to the
problem. 42 As many as one in four consumers trading vehicles in has
owed more on the trade-in vehicle than it is worth, and this figure
36 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 n.6 (1997).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
38 See id. § 1325(a) (5); Assocs. Commercial Corp., 520 U.S. at 957 (discussing application
of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) where a debtor chose to keep the collateral for use and exercise
the "cram-down" power).
39 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 839-42
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the relevance of purchase-money status).
40 Id. at 840; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (providing requirements for discharge).
41 See Robert Henderson, Understanding Finance: Auto Financing, MIAMI TIMES, Apr.
2-8, 2008, at 6D (advising consumers to avoid loans greater than four years due the depre-
ciating value).
42 See Danny Hakim, Owing More on an Auto than It's Worth as a Trade-In, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2004, at C1 (discussing, one year before the passing of BAPCPA, the escalation
from 2001-04 of lending practices resulting in such loans); Henderson, supra note 41 (dis-
cussing financing practices that consumers should be wary of).
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only accounts for those who are purchasing vehicles. 43 Trade-in nega-
tive equity contributes to this problem by allowing buyers to start "up-
side down."
Against this backdrop, the so-called "hanging paragraph" stepped
in. The BAPCPA was the culmination of reform efforts over a number
of years and the greatest change to the Bankruptcy Code since 1978.
4 4
The Act, in what some have called an "uninformed rush by Congress
to prevent bankruptcy abuse,' 4 5 amended 11 U.S.C. § 1325.46 The
amendment to section 1325 added the "hanging paragraph" after 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9):
For purposes of [11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)] paragraph (5), section 506
shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor
has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day pre-
ceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for
that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal
use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other
thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period
preceding that filing.
47
If the hanging paragraph applies, it prevents "cram-down" in
Chapter 13 cases. It operates by preventing section 506 from applying
and bifurcating the creditor's claim for purposes of section
1325 (a) (5), which gives the conditions for plan approval relating to
secured claims. 48 Thus, for purposes of plan approval, the hanging
paragraph treats the creditor as if it has a secured claim for the entire
amount owed, regardless of the collateral's value. 49 Treating the cred-
itor in this way requires the debtor to pay the full amount of such a
43 See Rosland B. Gammon, Dealers Hunt Upside-Down Buyers with Leases, Incentives and
Long-Term Loans, AUTOMOTIVE NEwS, May 5, 2008, at 38 (reporting figures from Edmunds.
corn for March of 2008).
44 See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (reviewing the legislative
history of the BAPCPA); George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 37
(2007) (discussing the BAPCPA generally in the introduction).
45 Timothy D. Moratzka, The "Hanging Paragraph" and Cramdown: 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)
and 506 After BAPCPA, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2006, at 18.
46 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
47 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). For context, note the titles within the original act. The hang-
ing paragraph appears in Title III, section 306(b) of the Act. Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act § 306(b). Title III is entitled "Discouraging Bankruptcy
Abuse," section 306 is entitled "Giving Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13,"
and subsection (b), which carries the amendment, is entitled "Restoring the Foundation
for Secured Credit." Id.
48 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 839-41
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing pre-BAPCPA law regarding cram-down and changes
made by the hanging paragraph).
49 Id. at 840.
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loan because the court cannot approve a Chapter 13 plan that does
not provide for the payment in full of the secured claim. 50
The hanging paragraph outlines five conditions for a creditor, in
the context of a motor vehicle loan, to qualify for its protection:
(1) the creditor must have a "purchase-money security interest"
(PMSI), (2) that PMSI must secure the debt that is subject to the
claim, (3) the debt must have been incurred within the 910 days pre-
ceding the filing of the petition, (4) the collateral must be a motor
vehicle as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102, and (5) the motor vehicle
must have been acquired for the personal use of the debtor.5 1 For
debt not secured by automobiles, requirements three, four, and five
are replaced by the requirements that (3) the collateral consist of any
other thing of value, and (4) the debt must have been incurred dur-
ing the year preceding the filing of the petition. 52
The requirement that a PMSI secure the debt is the subject of this
Note. Although some dispute on the other requirements is possible,
most of the requirements are easy to understand and the most prob-
lematic is the PMSI issue. This requirement is particularly important
regarding negative equity financed into the loan because such nega-
tive equity will always be above the value of the car purchased, and
therefore, depending on purchase-money status, it will be either
wholly unsecured or wholly secured. Two major questions will deter-
mine the answer: (1) what law applies to define PMSI, and (2) under
that law, what constitutes a PMSI.
II
CASES APPLYING (OR PURPORTING TO APPLY) STATE LAW
The vast majority of cases have held that state law defines the
term "purchase-money security interest" (PMSI) as used by the hang-
ing paragraph. 53 Courts applying state law to determine purchase-
money status look to the various state enactments of section 9-103 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.54 Those courts apply one of three
50 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. Of course, this assumes that the
holder of the secured claim does not accept the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) (A) (giv-
ing the alternative condition that "the holder of such claim has accepted the plan").
51 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a); see also Penrod, 392 B.R. at 841 (discussing the requirements of
the "Hanging Paragraph").
52 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
53 See, e.g., Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301
(I1th Cir. 2008); Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 923-26
(E.D. Mich. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Home, 390 BR, 191, 197 (E.D. Va.
2008); In reWall, 376 B.R. 769, 770-71 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2007); Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 258 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simp-
son, 369 B.R. 36, 45 (D. Kan. 2007).
54 See Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301; Muldrew, 396 B.R. at 923-26; Home, 390 B.R. at 197;
Wal 376 B.R. at 770-71; Peaslee, 373 B.R. at 258; Citifinancial Auto, 369 B.R. at 45.
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rules regarding the purchase-money status of negative equity financed
into the otherwise purchase-money loan. These rules are: (1) a PMSI
secures the negative equity;5 5 (2) the so-called transformation rule,
under which a PMSI does not secure the negative equity and the pres-
ence of a non-purchase-money obligation transforms the entire obli-
gation into a non-purchase-money debt;56 and (3) the so-called dual-
status rule, which bifurcates the loan into purchase-money and non-
purchase-money obligations. 57 This Part will examine the Uniform
Commercial Code definition and these three approaches. Part III will
address which rule is the better approach.
In the consumer goods context, the Uniform Commercial Code
defines PMSI in section 9-103(b) (1).58 A security interest is a PMSI
"to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with re-
spect to that security interest. ' 59  Section 9-103(a) (1) defines
"purchase-money collateral" as "goods . . .that secure [ ] a purchase-
money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral."60  A
"purchase-money obligation" is defined in section 9-103(a) (2) as "an
obligation . . .incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or
for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
the collateral if the value is in fact so used."61
This definition provides two categories of PMSI: sellers who re-
tain an interest to secure payment of part of the price achieve
purchase-money status through the first category for obligations in-
curred "as all or part of the price"; and third parties-such as banks-
achieve purchase-money status through the second category for "value
given to enable. '62 Most negative-equity cases involve third-party fi-
nance companies and therefore fall into the "value given" category.63
55 See, e.g., Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1303; Muldrew, 396 B.R. at 924; Wall, 376 B.R. at
770-71.
56 See, e.g., In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank
of Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re
Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 864
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R.
724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
57 See, e.g., In re Mierkowski, No. 08-44196-399, 2008 AIL 4449471, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. Sept. 29, 2008), rev'd, No. 08-3866, 2009 WL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re
Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 401
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Bandura, No. 08-50378, 2008 WL 2782851, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. July 15, 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796,
808 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); Citifinancial Auto, 369 B.R. at 46-47.
58 U.C.C. § 9-103(b) (1) (2006).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 9-103(a)(1).
61 Id. § 9-103(a) (2).
62 See generally 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18 (discussing purchase-money status).
63 See, e.g., In rePrice, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp.
(In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne,
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The difficulty of determining whether negative equity can qualify
for purchase-money status centers on whether it is part of the "price"
or "value given" to enable a debtor to acquire rights in the collateral.
64
Regarding "price" or "value given to enable," official Comment 3 of
U.C.C. § 9-103 states that the terms include "obligations for expenses
incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales
taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage
in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection
and enforcement, attorney's fees, and other similar obligations." 65 As
mentioned previously, a court can apply one of three rules: negative
equity as a PMSI, the transformation rule, or the dual-status rule.
66
A number of courts, including the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits,
have held that a PMSI does secure negative equity in this type of loan
and that therefore negative equity does not eliminate the purchase-
money status of the obligation. 67 Though purportedly applying state
law, courts in this category often cite Congress's intent to provide pro-
tection for creditors. 68 Regarding "price," some of these courts read
U.C.C. § 9-103 in pari materia69 with the definition of "cash sales price"
or "cash price" in motor vehicle statutes and conclude that a distinc-
tion exists between "cash price" and "price."70 In addition, many
courts point to the "other similar obligations" language of U.C.C. § 9-
103 Comment 3.71 Courts also cite the "close nexus" between the fi-
nancing of negative equity and the acquisition in determining that the
two were "part of a single transaction," giving that transaction
purchase-money status.72 Finally, in choosing not to apply the dual-
status rule, which would still provide some protection to creditors,
courts point to the wording of the BAPCPA, which says that the cram-
down provision will not apply if the creditor has a PMSI securing the
debt; some courts read this language to mean a PMSI securing any part
390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252
(W.D.N.Y. 2007).
64 See, e.g., Home, 390 B.R. at 198-99; In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 912-13 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 2006), affJd sub nom. Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295.
65 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
66 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
67 See Price, 562 F.3d 618; Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301-03.
68 See, e.g., Peaslee, 373 B.R. at 261; see also In re Long, 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)
(discussing Congress's intention to use the hanging paragraph to provide protection for
creditors in cases involving surrenders of collateral).
69 In pan materia (Latin for "in the same matter") refers to a canon of construction
that statutes in pari materia be construed together to resolve inconsistencies in one statute
by looking at another statute on the same subject. See BLACK'S LAW Dic-riONARV 862 (9th
ed. 2009).
70 See, e.g., Peaslee, 373 B.R. at 261; In re Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 633 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2008); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 109-10 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007); In re Petrocci, 370 B.R.
489, 494-96 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007).
71 E.g., Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301.
72 Cohrs, 373 B.R. at 110.
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of the debt, rather than meaning a PMSI securing the full amount of
the debt (which could only be satisfied if a PMSI secured negative
equity) .73
The New York Court of Appeals, the only state high court to ad-
dress this issue, used similar reasoning in answering a certified ques-
tion from the Second Circuit. The court first addressed "price" and
"value given" and gave both of these terms a "broad interpretation. '74
The court also looked to the use of the term "price" in the New York
Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, under which negative eq-
uity is included in the "cash sale price."75 Finally, the court looked to
Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-103 and reasoned that because a buyer
would often not be able to purchase a new vehicle without the financ-
ing of negative equity, a "close nexus" existed.
76
By delivering a split opinion, the court failed to provide an an-
swer that is likely to bring unity to future cases. An authoritative state-
ment from the New York Court of Appeals, a highly influential court
on U.C.C. matters, might have had this effect. However, in a powerful
dissent, Judge George Bundy Smith showed flaws in the majority's rea-
soning. 77 Judge Smith criticized the majority for failing to consider
the purpose of a PMSI and seeming to interpret the hanging para-
graph rather than Article 9 of the U.C.C. He pointed out that a PMSI
serves the function of giving a creditor who makes the purchase of
goods possible first claim to those goods. He rephrased the issue as:
"Is a lien resulting from the refinancing of a trade-in vehicle's 'nega-
tive equity' entitled to the special priority given PMSIs over other liens
by UCC article 9?"78 He reasoned that the answer must be no because
"'a loan procured to satisfy a pre-existing debt' is inconsistent with the
73 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) ("[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a claim ... if the
creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the
claim ...." (emphasis added)). Note that under this reasoning, the result would be the
same under the dual-status rule. Following this reasoning, applying the state law dual-status
rule, a PMSI would secure part of the claim; therefore, section 506 would not apply.
Courts applying the dual-status rule have generally bifurcated claims. See, e.g., Citifinancial
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36 (D. Kan. 2007). However, the District Court for
the Western District of Texas applied the state law dual-status rule but held that the hang-
ing paragraph still prohibited cram-down of the non-purchase-money portion of the debt
because a PMSI secured the remainder of the debt. In re Sanders, 403 B.R. 435, 444-45
(W.D. Tex. 2009) ("[T]he hanging paragraph applies to [the creditor's] claim regardless
of whether the charge for negative equity constitutes a purchase-money obligation.").
74 In re Peaslee, 2009 N.Y. slip op. 05197, 2009 WL 1766000, slip op. at 3-5 (N.Y. June
24, 2009).
75 Id.
76 Id. slip op. at 5.
77 The majority opinion coincides with a trend in the federal circuit courts toward
holding that a purchase-money security interest secures negative equity. See infra note 161.
How influential Judge Smith's reasoning will be remains to be seen.
78 Peaslee, 2009 WL 1766000, slip op. at 5.
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basic idea of a PMSI." 79 Concerned that the court was confusing the
state law and federal law questions, Judge Smith worried that the ma-
jority's decision would cloud other Article 9 issues. Whether or not
that is true, the split decision makes it unlikely that the court's pro-
nouncement will end the debate.
As one would expect, courts deciding that portions of loans at-
tributable to negative equity are not purchase-money obligations rea-
son that those portions are not part of the "price" of the collateral.80
These courts find alternative support in U.C.C. § 9-103 Comment 3.
For example, in In re Sanders, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Texas reasoned that the items listed were "expense items"
that were dissimilar from negative equity.81 The Middle District of
Florida's Bankruptcy Court reasoned that it was unlikely that the omis-
sion of negative equity from the comment was an oversight because
negative equity differed in both "type" and "magnitude" from the
listed expenses.8 2 Regarding the in pari materia argument, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida reasoned that the term
"price of collateral" was not ambiguous, and therefore the in pari
materia doctrine did not apply.83 The Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel held that negative equity does not enable acquisition of
the collateral.8 4 Regarding nexus between acquisition of the collateral
and the debt, these courts characterize the exchange as "two separate
financial transactions memorialized on a single retail installment con-
tract."8 5 These courts also find problems with whether the negative
equity provides direct assistance, whether the value given was "in fact
so used" to secure rights in the collateral, and whether negative equity
financing was required to purchase the collateral.
8 6
For courts holding that a PMSI does not secure negative equity,
the first approach is the "transformation rule." Under the transforma-
tion rule, the presence of negative equity takes the entire claim out of
79 Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Capital Commercial Auto. Fin. v. Spartan Motors, 246
A.D.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
80 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 849-50
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
81 See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 854-55 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435
(W.D. Tex. 2009).
82 In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 728-30 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
83 Id. at 728-29; cf. In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 06-32914, 2007 'AIL
3469454, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007) (pointing to the differing subject matter of
the motor vehicle statutes compared to the secured-transaction article of the Uniform
Commercial Code), rev'd sub nom. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191
(E.D. Va. 2008).
84 See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 850-52.
85 In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007) (citing In re Peaslee, 358 B.R.
545 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006)), rev'd, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009).
86 See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 848-51.
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the protections of the hanging paragraph.8 7 Bankruptcy courts in a
number of districts have adopted this rule;88 however, no district or
circuit court has followed.8 9 Courts applying this rule construe the
hanging paragraph narrowly.90 The Bankruptcy Court for the West-
ern District of Texas compared the hanging paragraph to other provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code using language such as "to the extent
of"'91 as evidence that Congress did not intend dual-status treatment in
this context.
9 2
The dual-status rule is far more forgiving to creditors; under the
dual-status rule, claims are bifurcated into purchase-money and non-
purchase-money debts, and the hanging paragraph applies only to the
purchase-money component of the claim.9 3 Revised Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code mandates this treatment in the commer-
cial context but leaves to the courts to determine the appropriate rule
87 See In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 140-41 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007).
88 E.g., In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220-21 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008), affd sub nom. Bank of
Am. v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In re
Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); Price, 363 B.R. at 746; In re Freeman,
362 B.R. 608, 611 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007).
89 See, e.g., Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1300-03
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that negative equity did not affect purchase-money status); Pen-
rod, 392 B.R. at 858 ("[T]he analysis [behind the transformation rule] turns on the assump-
tion that 'debt' refers to a unitary concept that cannot be divided. But the rest of the Code
belies this assumption ...."); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 262
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting bankruptcy court decisions that held that a PMSI did not se-
cure amounts attributable to negative equity and therefore not reaching the issue of trans-
formation rule versus dual-status rule); In re Wall, 376 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
2007) (holding that negative equity did not affect purchase-money status).
90 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) ("Congress could
certainly have drafted this provision to cover a broader class of creditors had it so in-
tended."), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
91 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7), 507(a)(8), 1322(b)(8) (2006)); see also 11
U.S.C. § 507(a) (6) (regarding prioritization and unsecured claims "only to the extent of
$4,000 for each such individual"); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (8) (regarding prioritization and "al-
lowed unsecured claims of governmental units"); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (8) (regarding the
contents of debtor's plan for "all or part of a claim").
92 This may raise the issue of whether the choice of the dual-status versus the transfor-
mation rule should be a federal question. Some courts, such as the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel of Ninth Circuit, have chosen to apply state law to determine that a PMSI does not
secure the negative equity and apply federal law to the choice of the dual-status versus the
transformation rule. See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 843-53, 855-56; see also Sanders, 377 B.R. at 860
n.21 (noting that the court's interpretation did not come from the U.C.C. or state transfor-
mation rules but from the "plain language of the [Bankruptcy] Code," which the court
interpreted as requiring that all of a creditor's claim be secured by the creditor's purchase-
money security interest). Part IV addresses problems with this choice. See infra Part IV.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas avoided some of these problems by
concluding that the hanging paragraph covered the entire debt as long as some portion of
the debt was secured by a PMSL. See Sanders, 403 B.R. 435 at 444-45 (reversing the bank-
ruptcy court's holding that the presence of a non-purchase-money obligation in the debt
moved the entire amount out of the protection of the hanging paragraph).
93 See, e.g., Penrod, 392 B.R. at 859 ("The Dual Status Rule gives lenders a PMSI equal
to the new value financed ... and a regular security interest for the balance.").
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in consumer transactions.9 4 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel pointed to this default rule for non-consumer transactions in
support of applying a dual-status rule. 95 Although not addressing neg-
ative equity in particular, in their treatise on the Uniform Commercial
Code, Professors James J. White and Robert S. Summers assert that
courts should apply the business (dual-status) rule by analogy in some
consumer cases. 9 6 White and Summers discuss loans that included
the refinancing of previous purchase-money debts owed to the same
lender, a different situation than the automotive context, where the
negative equity financed is often from another lender. However,
under the business (or not "consumer goods") rule of U.C.C. § 9-
103(f), these loans would still be treated under the dual-status rule.
97
Applied to the automotive context, where the negative equity is from
another lender, the rule states that a PMSI "does not lose its status as
such, even if.. . the purchase-money collateral also secures an obliga-
tion that is not a purchase-money obligation."98 The underlying issue
in both situations is whether a document could create both purchase-
money and non-purchase-money security interests. Courts applying
the dual-status rule often have characterized the transformation rule
as being too harsh on creditors. 99
Regarding choice of the foregoing rules, no clear winner has
emerged. As the following chart demonstrates, to date, at the circuit-
court level, the Eleventh, Eighth, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits and the
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel have ruled on the issue.10 0
Several district courts have ruled on the issue, holding either that a
94 See U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (2006) ("In a transaction other than a consumer-goods trans-
action, a purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if: (1) the
purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obliga-
tion .... ); id. § 9-103(h) ("The limitation [of § 9-103(f) to non-consumer transactions] is
intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods
transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in
consumer-goods transactions and may continue to apply established approaches."). But cf.
Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 45-48 (D. Kan. 2007) (applying the
Kansas version of the Uniform Commercial Code, KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-9-103 (West
2008), which did not include the limiting language in U.C.C. §§ 9-103(f) and (h)).
95 Penrod, 392 B.R. at 859 ("[T]he Dual Status Rule, as the default rule under Article
9, essentially captures both the lender's reasonable expectations and the debtor's eco-
nomic situation, and is consistent with the apparent purpose of the hanging paragraph.").
96 See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 137 (discussing loans, includ-
ing refinancing, and stating that "[iln these cases we believe the courts should apply the
business rule by analogy").
97 See U.C.C. § 9-103(f).
98 Id.
99 In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) ("Simply, application of
the transformation rule is too severe.").
100 See In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a purchase-money secur-
ity interest secured negative equity); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537




PMSI secured the negative equity or that the dual-status rule ap-
plied.101 The bankruptcy courts of the various circuits have applied
all three rules. 10 2 The following chart of cases is organized by the
state whose law is being applied, then by level of court, and then fi-
nally by date. In the "Rule" column of the chart, decisions holding
that a PMSI secures negative equity are designated "Y," those applying
the dual-status rule are designated "D," and those applying the trans-
formation rule are designated "T."
RULE Case Name Citation Court Cir. State Date
D In reTuck 2007 WL 4365456 Bankr. M.D. Ala. 11 Ala. 12/10/2007
Y In re Harless 2008 WL 3821781 Bankr. N.D. Ala. 11 Ala. 8/13/2008
D In re Penrod 2008 WL 3854465 B.A.P. 9th Cir. 9 Cal. 7/28/2008
D In re Acaya 369 B.R. 564 Bankr. N.D. Cal. 9 Cal. 5/18/2007
Y In re Cohrs 373 B.R. 107 Bankr. E.D. Cal. 9 Cal. 7/31/2007
Y In re Watson 2007 WL 2873434 Bankr. E.D. Cal. 9 Cal. 9/27/2008
T In re Blakeslee 377 B.R. 724 Bankr. M.D. Fla. 11 Fla. 9/19/2007
T In re Schwalm 380 B.R. 630 Bankr. M.D. Fla. 11 Fla. 1/16/2008
Y In re Graupner 537 F.3d 1295 11th Cir. 11 Ga. 8/6/2008
Y Graupner v. 2007 WL 1858291 M.D. Ga. 11 Ga. 6/26/2007
Nuvell Credit
Y In re Graupner 356 B.R. 907 Bankr. M.D. Ga. 11 Ga. 12/21/2006
D In re Hernandez 388 B.R. 883 Bankr. C.D. Ill 7 Il. 6/9/2008
Y In re Howard 405 B.R. 901 Bankr. N.D. Ill. 7 I1. 06/16/2009
Y In re Myers 393 B.R. 616 Bankr. S.D. Ind. 7 Ind. 7/13/2008
Y In re Ford 574 F.3d 1279 10th Cir. 10 Kan. 08/03/2009
V In re Padgett 408 B.R. 374 10th Cir. B.A.P. 10 Kan. 07/20/2009
D Citifinancial Auto 369 B.R. 36 D. Kan. 10 Kan. 5/17/2007
v. Hernandez-
Simpson
D In re Kellerman 377 B.R. 302 Bankr. D. Kan. 10 Kan. 8/15/2007
V In re Ford 387 B.R. 827 Bankr. D. Kan. 10 Kan. 5/8/2008
D In re Padgett 389 B.R. 203 Bankr. D. Kan. 10 Kan. 5/27/2008
D In re Bandura 2008 WL 2782851 Bankr. E.D. Ky. 6 Ky. 7/15/2008
T In re Look 383 B.R. 210 Bankr. D. Me. I Me. 3/6/2008
y In re Muldrew 2008 WL 4458798 E.D. Mich. 6 Mich. 10/3/2008
101 The District Courts for the Western District of New York, the Eastern District of
Virginia, and the Eastern District of Michigan have held that a purchase-money security
interest secures negative equity. See Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew),
396 B.R. 915, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne, 390 B.R.
191, 205 (E.D. Va. 2008); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 262
(W.D.N.Y. 2007). The District Court for the District of Kansas applied the dual-status rule.
See Citifinancial Auto v. Hemandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48-49 (D. Kan. 2007).
102 See, e.g., In re Padgett, 389 B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (applying the dual-
status rule); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (applying the trans-
formation rule); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 110-11 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a
purchase-money security interest secured negative equity).
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RULE Case Name Citation Court Cir. State Date
D In re Busby 393 B.R. 443 Bankr. S.D. Miss. 5 Miss. 8/28/2008
Y In re Callicott 2009 WL 2870501 8th Cir. 8 Mo. 09/09/2009
y In re Mierkowski 2009 WL 2853586 8th Cir. 8 Mo. 09/09/2009
D In re Callicott 396 B.R. 506 E.D. Mo. 8 Mo. 11/12/2008
Y In reWeiser 381 B.R. 263 Bankr. W.D. Mo. 8 Mo. 12/18/2007
D In re Callicott 386 B.R. 232 Bankr. E.D. Mo. 8 Mo. 4/14/2008
D In re Mierkowski 2008 WL 4449471 Bankr. E.D. Mo. 8 Mo. 9/29/2008
Y In reWall 376 B.R. 769 Bankr. W.D.N.C. 4 N.C. 9/17/2007
T In re Price 363 B.R. 734 Bankr. E.D.N.C. 4 N.C. 3/6/2007
D In re Conyers 379 B.R. 576 Bankr. M.D.N.C. 4 N.C. 11/2/2007
D In re Wells Fargo 2007 WL 5297071 Bankr. E.D.N.C. 4 N.C. 11/14/2007
Financial North
Carolina 1, Inc.
Y In re Price 562 F.3d 618 4th Cir. 4 N.C. 4/13/2009
D In reJernigan 2008 WL 922346 Bankr. E.D.N.C. 4 N.C. 3/31/2008




T In re Peaslee 358 B.R. 545 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 12/22/2006
T In reJackson 358 B.R. 560 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 1/10/2007
T In re Grant 359 B.R. 438 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 2/8/2007
T In re Cassidy 362 B.R. 596 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Colombai 362 B.R. 605 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Freeman 362 B.R. 608 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Martinez 362 B.R. 600 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Phillips 362 B.R. 612 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Rodwell 362 B.R. 616 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
T In re Vanmanen 362 B.R. 620 Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 3/1/2007
Y In re Petrocci 370 B.R. 489 Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2 N.Y. 6/20/2007
D In reJohnson 380 B.R. 236 Bankr. D. Or. 9 Ore. 12/18/2007
D In re Riach 2008 WL 474384 Bankr. D. Or. 9 Ore. 2/19/2008
D GMAC v. Mancini 390 B.R. 796 Bankr. M.D. Pa. 3 Pa. 7/15/2008
(In re Mancini)
Y In reVinson 391 B.R. 754 Bankr. D.S.C. 4 S.C. 1/25/2008
D In re Bray 365 B.R. 850 Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 6 Tenn. 4/11/2007
D In reHayes 376 B.R. 655 Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 6 Tenn. 11/1/2007
D In re Mitchell 379 B.R. 131 Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 6 Tenn. 11/13/2007
Y In re Gray 382 B.R. 438 Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 6 Tenn. 2/15/2008
Y In re Dale 2009 WL 2857998 5th Cir. 5 Tex. 09/09/2009
T In re Sanders 377 B.R. 836 Bankr. W.D. Tex. 5 Tex. 10/18/2007
Y In re Sanders 403 B.R. 435 W.D. Tex. 5 Tex. 3/30/2009
D In re Steele 2008 WL 2486060 Bankr. N.D. Tex. 5 Tex. 6/12/2008
D In re Brodowski 391 B.R. 393 Bankr. S.D. Tex. 5 Tex. 7/22/2008
Y In re Dale 2008 WL 4287058 Bankr. S.D. Tex. 5 Tex. 8/14/2008
176
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RULE Case Name Citation Court Cir. State Date
Y In re Burt 378 B.R. 352 Bankr. D. Utah 10 Utah 10/24/2007
Y In reAustin 381 B.R. 892 Bankr. D. Utah 10 Utah 2/12/2008
Y GMAC v. Horne 390 B.R. 191 E.D. Va. 4 Va. 7/3/2008
D In re Pajot 371 B.R. 139 Bankr. E.D. Va. 4 Va. 7/17/2007
D In re Lavigne 2007 WL 3469454 Bankr. E.D. Va. 4 Va. 11/14/2007
D In re Munzberg 388 B.R. 529 Bankr. D. Vt. 2 Vt. 6/3/2008
D In re Munzberg 389 B.R. 822 Bankr. D. Vt. 2 Vt. 6/3/2008
D In reWear 2008 WL 217172 Bankr. W.D. Wash. 9 Wash. 1/23/2008
V In re Dunlap 383 B.R. 113 Bankr. E.D. Wis. 7 Wis. 1/31/2008
III
THE OUTLIER-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO APPLIES
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio reached
a unique conclusion in its decision in In re Westfall. Feeling impelled
to the conclusion that a consistent rule of law was needed by the
"maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions,"1 0 3 the court held that a
federal definition was appropriate. 0 4 The court had initially con-
cluded that the creditor's interests were wholly non-purchase-money
by applying the transformation rule from Ohio state law. 10 5 However,
the court then requested and received additional briefing on the
choice-of-law issue and went on to conclude that the statute called for
a federal definition of "purchase-money security interest."10 6 The
court concluded that, under this federal definition, a PMSI did not
secure negative equity and the dual-status rule applied, allowing the
debtor to bifurcate the claim.
10 7
A. Application of the Current Choice of Law Standard
To determine if a federal definition was appropriate, the court
looked initially to the three-prong standard enunciated by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Dzikowski v. Northern Trust Bank of Florida.'0 8 The Elev-
enth Circuit had summarized the considerations as "[1] the need for
uniformity, [2] whether application of state law frustrates important
federal policies, and [3] the impact of federal common law on preex-
103 Westfal4 376 B.R. at 213.
104 Id. at 220.
105 See id. at 211-12.
106 See id. at 212. Note, however, that the court did complain of a lack of briefing on
this issue by the creditors. Id. at 213 n.2 ("Much of Nuvell's supplemental brief is of little
help in deciding the question posed by the court. Nuvell focused on urging the court to
reconsider its previous interpretation of Ohio law.").
107 Id. at 220.
108 Dzikowski v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A. (In re Prudential of Fla. Leasing, Inc.), 478
F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007); see Westfall, 376 B.R. at 214.
20091
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isting commercial relationships premised on state law."' 0 9 The
Westfall court characterized application of the Dzikowski standard as a
"muddle on the current facts." 110
Regarding the uniformity prong, the Westfall court noted that
uniformity encouraged adoption of a federal definition in order to
"promote similar treatment of debtors and creditors.""1  The court
did not view the argument as being dispositive. 112 It reasoned that
uniformity was a key factor "when there is a threat that a federal right
would be impinged or diminished"113 but then determined that no
such federal right was at stake in this situation." 4
The court concluded that it could not satisfy the second prong of
the test-whether use of state law impermissibly abridged core federal
policies of the Bankruptcy Code-because of unclear congressional
intent regarding the extent of the protection afforded by the hanging
paragraph.1 5 To determine if a conflict existed, the court quoted the
Sixth Circuit's test from the context of conflict preemption, stating
that a conflict is found "'where it is impossible to comply with both
federal and state law, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'11 6 Addressing this prong of the test, the court concluded
that there was "no way to delineate the extent of the protection" that
Congress intended the hanging paragraph to provide. 117
After briefly noting that a federal definition provided no greater
disruption to transactions traditionally governed by state law than
would exist otherwise, the court concluded that the established stan-
dard was "a muddle on the current facts."'" 8 Rather than addressing
whether the "muddle" meant that state or federal law should apply,
the court, citing no authority, decided that the "ill-fitting drape of the
109 Dzikowski, 478 F.3d at 1298 (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Cir. 1996)).
110 Westfall, 376 B.R. at 216.
111 Id. at 215.
112 See id. ("[A]n appeal for uniformity does not 'prove its need.'" (quoting Atherton v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997))).
113 Id.
114 Id. Note that the court gave the following rule to make that determination: "'[A]
conflict is found where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (quoting 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTH-
ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcrION § 36:9 (6th ed. 2006)). This test is strikingly similar to
the test articulated for the second prong of whether the use of state law impermissibly
abridges core federal policy. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
115 See Westfa, 376 B.R. at 216.
116 Id. (quoting Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 2000)).
117 Id. (discussing the sparse legislative history and noting that most courts conclude
that the intent of the hanging paragraph was to protect creditors from cram-downs, but




rule of decision cloth serves as proof of the necessity of an exception
on these unique facts."1 19 The court went on to apply what it called
the "excluded purpose" exception.
120
B. Westfall Court Applies the "Excluded Purpose Exception"
The Westfall Court articulated its "excluded purpose exception"
as meaning that "a state statute should not serve as a federal rule of
decision if the federal purpose was excluded from the state law."'
21
The court's analysis largely depended on the following language from
Comment 8 from U.C.C. § 9-103:
Whether a security interest is a "purchase-money security interest"
under other law is determined by that law. For example, decisions
under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dual-
status and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not
expressly adopt the state law definition of "purchase-money security
interest." Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Arti-
cle does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.
122
After a discussion of the use of the comments in interpreting the
provisions of the U.C.C., the court asserted that its use of Comment 8
did not involve the "most common objection to use of the Com-
ments."123 The court declared that it was using the comment not to
interpret the statute but merely to illustrate that the application of the
state law here was beyond its intended scope. 124 The court stated that
because of the U.C.C. drafters' "intentional non-decision" and the "far
from comprehensive" state case law, attempting to divine state law on
this subject was similar to "divining water with a forked stick."125 This
lack of authority, combined with the language of the comments specif-
ically stating that the drafters did not intend to apply section 9-103 to
law outside of the U.C.C., led the court to conclude that there was no
strong state interest in applying the state definition in this context.
126
C. Cited, Misunderstood, and Not Followed: Subsequent
Treatment of In re Westfall
No court has followed In re Westfall in its choice to apply a federal
definition for PMSI. Of the cases that have cited Westfall, a number of
119 Id.
120 Id. Part II.B will describe the Westfall court's application of the excluded-purpose
exception. Part 1II.B will not provide any critical analysis of this approach. However, this
Note will argue in Part IV that this exception is both inappropriate and logically flawed.
121 Westfal4 376 B.R. at 216.
122 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2006).
123 Westfal4 376 B.R. at 217-18.
124 See id. at 218.
125 Id. at 219.
126 See id.
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them have merely cited Westfall as support for the dual-status rule
without mentioning the choice-of-law question, which made Westfall
unique. 12 7 Several courts have noted the choice of a federal rule but
have declined to follow. 128 Other courts have cited Westfall positively
on other issues without noting the federalism issue but not for sup-
port of the dual-status rule. 2 9 In its opinion certifying to the New
York Court of Appeals the question of whether a PMSI secured nega-
tive equity, the Second Circuit cited In re Westfall twice for other points
without mentioning the federalism question.1 30 Clearly based on this
history, the Westfall court's hope of providing a uniform federal rule




This Part will begin by examining two approaches to the choice-
of-law question. Both of these approaches choose federal law to some
127 See In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), affd sub nom. Ford v. Ford
Motor Credit Corp., 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009); In reDawn S., No. 07-15884, 2008 W"L
5747423 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008); In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 138-39 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2007) (mentioning Westfallfor the dual-status rule and then criticizing the case
for failing to recognize that the choice between the transformation rule and the dual-status
rule should be federal law); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007); In re
Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 858 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
128 See Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 858-59
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (applying federal law only on the question of dual-status rule or
transformation rule); In re Howard, 405 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Mc-
Cauley, 398 B.R. 41, 44 & n.3 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (noting Westfall in a footnote and
declining to follow); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 464-65, 464 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008);
In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 216-17
(Bankr. D. Me. 2008) (contrasting Westfall with Sanders and deciding to apply state law
under the reasoning of Sanders), affd sub nom. Bank of Am. v. Look, No.08-129-P-H, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695 (D. Me. July 17, 2008); In reJohnson, 380 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2007); In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 06-32914, 2007 WL 3469454, at *5 n.6
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007), rev'd sub nom. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Horne,
390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008).
129 See Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1300-03
(11th Cir. 2008); Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Muldrew (In reMuldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 922-23
& nn.9-10 (E.D. Mich. 2008); In reHall, 400 B.R. 516,519-21 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008); In
re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 398 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883,
884-85 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 668-71, 668 n.18, 671 n.24
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007).
130 See Reiber v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177,
184-85, 184 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting the Westfall court's characterization of the case
law as a "'maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions"' and citing Westfall for treatment of
the U.C.C. comments). The Second Circuit did not address or follow Westfall regarding
choice of law and concluded, at least for purposes of certifying the U.C.C. question to the
New York Court of Appeals, that state law governs the definition of PMSI. See id. at 184
("We... believe furthermore that state law governs the definition of PMSI in the hanging
paragraph.").
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extent to determine purchase-money status. While both approaches,
if uniformly adopted, would provide more certain answers than apply-
ing state law, this Note will argue that both approaches contain major
flaws in reasoning. Next, it will argue that Congress intended for state
law to apply and will provide analysis of the author's opinion of the
best answer under amended Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Finally, this Part will argue that, given the current situation and
economic climate, Congress should modify the hanging paragraph to
provide a uniform answer.
B. Choice of Law
1. State Law Determining What Congress Meant? The Problem with
Westfall
Judge Kendig was mistaken in In re Westfall to apply a federal defi-
nition of PMSI. The plain-meaning doctrine 131 supports application
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code is
the authority cited by Black's Law Dictionary for its definition of a
PMSI, which coincides with U.C.C. § 9-103.132 The language of the
hanging paragraph itself gives no other definition, although it pro-
vides a specific definition of the term "motor vehicle."1 33 The legisla-
tive history provides no indication of any other definition.
134
Judge Kendig's "excluded purpose" exception is inherently inco-
herent, a problem that may explain the lack of authority cited. The
language of Comment 8, even if one were to assume that it was a bind-
ing interpretation of the U.C.C., is merely a truism. Ironically, Judge
Kendig's exception violates that truism. The Comment concludes,
"Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not,
and could not, determine a question of federal law."' 35 By looking to
state law, written prior to the enactment of the BAPCPA, Judge Ken-
dig determined that Congress could not have chosen to defer to state
law as a rule of decision under the BAPCPA. He could have meant
that Congress must have been aware of Comment 8 and must have
chosen to respect it, but he provided no evidence in the legislative
history to justify such an assertion. Instead, he seemed to be implying
that the state law itself excludes this purpose. This reading has the
state law choosing the federal rule of decision rather than the federal
131 See generally In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 912 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (providing a
detailed analysis of the plain-meaning doctrine), affd sub nom Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295.
132 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009).
133 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (stating as to purchase-money security interests
only that "section 506 shall not apply to a claim . .. if the creditor has a purchase money
security interest"), with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (providing a cross-reference to 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102 for a definition of "motor vehicle").
134 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the limited legislative history of the provision).
135 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2006).
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rule of decision choosing to look to state law. In the words of Com-
ment 8, state law is determining the federal-law question of whether to
look to the state law. Of course, state law itself cannot determine fed-
eral law. Unfortunately, this answer does not assist with the question
of whether Congress intended to look to state law. Part IV.C examines
this question.
2. Splitting the Baby-Where the Ninth Circuit Went Wrong
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, in In re Penrod,136
was mistaken in the application of state law to answer that a PMSI did
not secure the negative equity and the application of federal law to
determine that the "dual-status" rule applied. 137 Under this rule, a
federal court would apply the dual-status rule regardless of whether
the state involved had adopted the transformation rule in negative-
equity situations.138 This splitting-the-baby approach-similar to the
approach of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Texas139-while purporting to apply state law to determine purchase-
money status, does not apply state law and is unsound.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, one cannot separate the
questions of whether a PMSI secures a debt and whether the dual-
status or the transformation rule applies because the latter question
necessarily answers the former. For example, consider a situation
where the state law holds that a PMSI does not secure negative equity,
but the claim includes a portion that would have purchase-money sta-
tus if no other amounts were included. If one stopped at this point,
without answering the question of dual-status or transformation, the
only question answered is a purely hypothetical one: "If no other
amounts were included, would a PMSI secure this portion (not includ-
ing the negative equity) of the claim?" Whether a PMSI actually does
secure that portion depends on whether the dual-status or transforma-
tion rule applies. If the transformation rule applies, no PMSI secures
any portion of the claim. If the dual-status rule applies, a PMSI
secures the part of the claim having purchase-money status. The ques-
tion of dual-status rule or transformation rule is actually a question of
which of two definitions applies.
136 Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 856-59 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008).
137 See id. at 859.
138 See id. (discussing the distinction between applying the dual-status rule as the state
law and adopting the dual-status rule as a uniform federal rule).
139 See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 & n.20 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (applying state
law to determine that negative equity was not secured by a PMSI and holding that the
hanging paragraph required that if part of the claim was not secured by a PMSI then the
hanging paragraph did not apply), rev'd, 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit did not
seem to appreciate the significance of choosing between the dual-sta-
tus and transformation rules. Because the choice of dual-status or
transformation rule is a choice between definitions, the panel in fact
interpreted the statute to create a federal definition for PMSI in situa-
tions involving negative equity. 140 One could phrase this definition as
follows: a PMSI secures a claim to the extent that there is a portion of
the claim that under the relevant state law a PMSI would secure if that
portion were isolated from all other portions of the claim. When
phrased this way, one would naturally question whether the simple
language of the hanging paragraph could support such a complicated
interpretation.141 The lack of any statement regarding choice of law
or definition argues against Congress having intended to adopt such a
complicated rule of decision.
Although one could read the lack of statement regarding choice
of law to imply using only a state-law definition, 142 one could deter-
mine-as did the court in In re Penrod-that a split definition should
apply. Even though applying the dual-status rule in this situation is
not coherent, applying the transformation rule is less problematic.
143
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas took this ap-
proach in In re Sanders.14
4
The court in In re Sanders applied the transformation rule as a
federal rule for purposes of the hanging paragraph. The court con-
cluded that narrowing the exception of the hanging paragraph by re-
quiring that a PMSI secure the entire claim "comports best with
accepted canons of statutory construction." 145 This rule does not suf-
fer from the same problems as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appel-
140 See Penrod, 392 B.R. at 859 n.25 (using language that limited the application of the
federal rule to negative-equity situations and stating that, "adopting the Dual Status Rule as
a uniform federal rule.... we would apply the Dual Status Rule even if, under the majority
version of UCC § 9-103(h), a state decided to adopt the Transformation Rule in negative
equity situations" (emphasis added)).
141 See 1l U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (using much simpler language with no mention of a
split definition). To be fair, the court could have reached an identical, less problematic
result by interpreting the language of the hanging paragraph to apply to any obligation
that is secured at least in part by a PMSI. This approach was taken by the District Court for
the Western District of Texas. Sanders, 403 B.R. 435, rev'g Sanders, 377 B.R. 836; see also infra
notes 132-35 and accompanying text. However, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel grounded its decision in the definition of PMSI, not an interpretation of whether the
hanging paragraph required the entire obligation to be secured by a PMSI. See generally
Penrod, 392 B.R. 835.
142 See infra Part M.D.
143 See supra Part tV.B.2 (discussing incoherence in the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel's approach in In re Penrod).
144 See Sanders, 377 B.R. at 864 ("[S]ection 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code affords
special protection ... so long as the purchase money security interest secures all of the




late Panel's dual-status-rule approach in In re Penrod. State law
determines whether a PMSI secures all or part of the claim by apply-
ing its version of the U.C.C., which will use either the dual-status or
the transformation rule. The federal rule, as articulated by the court
in In re Sanders, determines not PMSI status but whether or not a PMSI
must secure the entire amount of the claim for the claim to fall under
the protection of the hanging paragraph.
146
This rule functions differently from applying a federal "dual-sta-
tus" rule. If the state law applies the dual-status rule, then a PMSI
would not secure the entire amount; the Sanders rule would then deny
protection of the hanging paragraph, a result similar in effect to a
state-law transformation rule. If the state law applies the transforma-
tion rule, then a PMSI would not secure any amount, and again, the
hanging paragraph would not apply. If the state law held that a PMSI
secured negative equity, and no other non-purchase-money obliga-
tions were included, then a PMSI would secure the entire amount.
C. Congress Meant for State Law to Control
Three courts-the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, and the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio-have applied federal
law to some extent. As demonstrated above, all three approaches are
less than desirable, and the opinions of both the Ninth Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel and the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio contain serious flaws in reasoning. The Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Texas made less serious errors in
determining that federal law should apply; however, its textualist argu-
ment failed to address congressional intent.
The plain language of the statute indicates that state law controls.
The term "purchase-money security interest" originated in the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Indeed, the only authority Black's Law Dic-
tionary cites for its definition of a PMSI is the Uniform Commercial
Code. 147 The term is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, even
though it is used both in the hanging paragraph and in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f).1 48 In this regard, the court in In re Sanders did not err. The
Sanders court asserted that the language clearly indicates that a PMSI
must secure the entire claim for it to qualify under the hanging para-
graph. Although the court makes a reasonable argument for this
reading, it does not address Congress's intent for state law to apply.
146 See id. (holding that, because the claim included purchase-money and non-
purchase-money security interests, it did not qualify for the protection of the hanging
paragraph).
147 BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1478 (9th ed. 2009).
148 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2006).
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Some courts and commentators have lamented the lack of legisla-
tive history for the hanging paragraph. However, as one court put it,
the "only clear intent discerned from the legislative history of the
hanging paragraph is that Congress intended to provide more protec-
tion to creditors with purchase-money security interests." 149 The para-
graph's position within the BAPCPA supports this argument. It is
section 306 of Chapter 13 of the Act. Section 306 is entitled "Giving
Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13," and it appears in a
chapter of the BAPCPA entitled "Restoring the Foundation for Se-
cured Credit."' 50 The House Judiciary Committee's report recom-
mending the passage of the bill discusses the hanging paragraph in
two places; in both, it discusses only protection of secured creditors.
15'
There is also some evidence that Congress wanted to make Chapter 13
less attractive to debtors.1 52
Though the Sanders court makes a plausible argument, given the
clear intent of the hanging paragraph, the result, similar to the state-
law transformation rule, does not meet the congressional intent. The
result is too narrow to provide the type of protection that Congress
seems to have envisioned. The application chosen by the Penrod court
does not reflect the language of the statute and is incoherent. Given
these issues, the general meaning of PMSI as a state-law term from the
U.C.C. and the lack of legislative history regarding a more complex
choice-of-law rule, Congress must have intended state law to apply.
D. Uniform Commercial Code Application
In applying state law, the better answer is that a PMSI does not
secure negative equity and the dual-status rule should apply.
The U.C.C. defines a PMSI in section 103 of Article 9. Under the
U.C.C., a security interest is a PMSI to the extent that the goods-in
this case the motor vehicle-"are purchase-money collateral with re-
spect to that security interest."' 53  Section 9-103(a) (1) defines
"purchase-money collateral" as "goods ... that [secure] a purchase-
149 In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (discussing intent in the
context of deciding whether, pursuant to the hanging paragraph, surrender of motor vehi-
cles to creditors would result in a full satisfaction of the creditor's claims).
150 Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80-81 (2005).
151 See H.R. RFP. No. 109-31, at 17 (2005) (labeling discussion as "Protections for Se-
cured Creditors"); id. at 71-72 (describing the application of the hanging paragraph).
152 Oversight of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (providing an example of how the law removed some of the incentives for
Chapter 13 filing and identifying the anti-cramdown provision of the hanging paragraph as
one such provision).
153 U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2006).
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money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral."'154 Diffi-
culty occurs in the definition of a "purchase-money obligation" con-
tained in U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).
Which part of the language of U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2) should apply
depends on whether the creditor was the seller or a third-party lender.
For third-party lenders, the first half of § 9-103(a) (2), the "part of the
price" language does not apply. 155 The "part of the price" language
refers to sellers who accept an obligation to themselves from the obli-
gors. The correct focus in those cases is on the following language
from U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2): "for value given to enable the debtor to
acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so
used.' 56  Therefore, for third-party lenders the focus becomes
whether value given by a third-party lender to pay for negative equity
does "enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collat-
eral"; and for seller-obligees, the question becomes whether the nega-
tive equity was all or part of the price of the collateral. 157 However, this
distinction may be of little importance because courts and even the
Code's official comments often do not distinguish between the two,
implying that the result should be the same under either provision. 158
Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-103 elaborates on the definition and
gives the following list of types of items that are included in either
"price" of collateral or "value given to enable": "obligations for ex-
penses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral,
sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of
storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of col-
lection and enforcement, attorney's fees, and other similar obliga-
tions."'1 59 This list is not exclusive, as the last item, "other similar
obligations" indicates. Courts differ on whether negative equity is a
"similar obligation.' 6 °
154 Id. §9-103(a)(1).
155 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 135 ("[A] third party... that lends
money to a prospective buyer to assist the buyer in the purchase can .. .also qualify as a
purchase money lender under section 9-103 (a) (2). That person must make advances or
incur an obligation 'to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral,' and,
the money lent must be 'in fact so used.'" (footnote omitted)).
156 U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2); see 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 31-6(a), at 135.
157 See, e.g., In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911-12 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (focusing, in
a case involving a seller-lender, on whether the obligation was incurred as all or part of the
price of the collateral), affd sub nom. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 537 F.3d 1295 (11 th
Cir. 2008).
158 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796,
800-01 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (failing to distinguish in the context of a third-party lender
holding the security interest); U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (failing to distinguish when providing
a list of items that would be included and listing what "the 'price' of collateral or the 'value
given to enable' includes").
159 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
160 See supra tbl.
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The better-reasoned argument is that payment of the negative eq-
uity from the trade-in vehicle does not enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of the collateral. None of the listed obligations are
related to prior transactions, unlike negative equity, which must origi-
nate in a prior transaction. While some courts have held that negative
equity does "enable" the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral be-
cause the buyer could not make the purchase without the trade-in, the
majority have held that negative equity does not "enable" the debtor
to acquire rights in the collateral. 161
Because a PMSI does not secure the negative equity, the dual-
status rule is the better approach. 162 The drafters of Article 9 pro-
vided guidance in the non-consumer context through section 9-
103(f) (1).163 The drafters, however, did not find the courage to give a
rule for consumer transactions and adopted section 9-103(h) specifi-
cally disavowing any inference of application to that setting.164 The
drafters' unwillingness to unsettle previous case law under prior Arti-
cle 9 does not mean that applying the dual-status rule is any less pref-
erential. The transformation rule results in very harsh treatment;
even a tiny fraction of non-purchase-money obligation will cause the
entire interest to lose purchase-money status. 165 The majority of
courts holding that negative equity is not a purchase-money obligation
apply the dual-status rule.1 66 Courts should apply this rule, which is
analogous to the business rule.
161 See id. However, one should note that there is a growing consensus among the
federal circuit courts that a PMSI does secure negative equity. See, e.g., In re Price, 562 F.3d
618 (4th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.
2009); In re Mierkowski, No. 08-3866, 2009 "AL 2853586 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); In re Dale,
No. 08-20583, 2009 WL 2857998 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2009); Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295. While
these courts are interpreting state law, at least one of the circuits has articulated that given
the uniform nature of the provisions, courts may give added weight to these decisions
across state lines. See Ford, 574 F.3d at 1283 n.2 (noting the identical nature of the provi-
sions being interpreted).
162 One should not consider the application to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act in determining choice of rule. See supra Part IV.C.
163 Although note that in the case of the negative equity from a loan held by the same
financier, negative equity might retain purchase-money status. See U.C.C. § 9-103(0 (3).
164 Notice, however, that Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, and South Dakota have omitted the
limiting language of U.C.C. § 9-103(h) from their versions of the U.C.C. See IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 28-9-103 (2001); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. §84-9-103 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CoM.
LAw § 9-103 (LexisNexis 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103 (2004).
165 See, e.g., In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R
393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); GMAC v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883 (Bankr. C.D. I1. 2008).
166 See supra tbl.
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E. Cleaning Up Its Own Mess-The Need for Congressional
Action
It does not follow from the intent to apply state law that Congress
anticipated or desired the resulting inconsistency. Unfortunately, as a
number of courts have lamented,1 67 little legislative history is availa-
ble.' 68 However, even from that limited history, what seems clear is
that the purpose of the hanging paragraph was to aid creditors.
69
Even if Congress intended such a variety of rules, the result is not
aiding creditors due to difficulties in valuing loans. Therefore,
whether one thinks that the aid to creditors was an appropriate or
inappropriate goal, the hanging paragraph is aiding neither lenders
nor borrowers.
At one point, this difficulty was not of great concern to taxpayers.
Today, however, the stakes for the taxpayer-as a sixty-percent share-
holder in the so-called "new" General Motors-are much higher.
70
Taxpayers have contributed over fifty billion dollars to General Mo-
tors alone, 17' and the government is unlikely to recoup much of the
investment. 72 This issue is of great concern to the taxpayer-share-
holder because of the extent to which the industry has historically re-
lied on its financing divisions for revenue.'
73
This situation presents Congress with an opportunity to reevalu-
ate the wisdom of the hanging paragraph. Although some will likely
argue that Congress should remove the hanging paragraph from the
Bankruptcy Code, this would be a mistake. The government has in-
vested $50 billion in General Motors, $34 billion in Chrysler, and
$12.5 billion in GMAC. 174 Allowing reckless borrowers to leave the
167 See, e.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In rePenrod), 392 B.R. 835, 856-57
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
168 See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
169 See supra Part IV.C (discussing congressional intent regarding the hanging para-
graph and supporting legislative history).
170 Peter Whoriskey, With Bankruptcy Behind It, GM Focuses on a Culture Change, WASH.
PosT, July 11, 2009 ("The U.S. Treasury owns 60.8 percent of the new company's common
stock ....").
171 Id.
172 Christopher S. Rugaber, Taxpayers Face Heavy Losses on Auto Bailout, Sept. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.greenchange.org/article.php?id=4914 ("The Congressional Over-
sight Panel did not provide an estimate of the projected loss ... [, b]ut it said most of the
$23 billion initially provided to General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC late last year is
unlikely to be repaid.").
173 See Carty, supra note 33. Note that in May the Treasury announced that it would
swap $884 million of its preferred-stock investment in GMAC for common stock giving a
35.4% equity stake, a stake that could rise above 50% if more of those investments were
converted later. See Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Dan Fitzpatrick, GMAC Says It Needs $1 Billion
in Cost Cuts, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2009, at B5.
174 SeeJeff Bennett & Kate Haywood, Chrysler Financial Repays TARP Loan, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, July 14, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB24759479331840133.
html. The government had loaned Chrysler Financial $1.5 billion from the Troubled Asset
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automakers with these debts will merely transfer the crammed down
amounts to the taxpayer. For these reasons, Congress should retain
the anti-cram-down provisions in the revised legislation.
On the other hand, the problem of unwise borrowing, which
both exposes the economy as a whole and the individual consumer to
great risk, cautions against retaining the anti-cram-down provisions. A
definition including negative equity would encourage lenders to con-
tinue to make these problematic "upside down" loans. Yet, a defini-
tion functioning like the transformation rule would be a windfall to
unwise borrowers at the expense of lenders, other consumers, and
even the taxpayer. An open definition functioning like the dual-status
rule would run the risk of similar problems to the current definition
regarding other items included in automotive loans such as gap insur-
ance and extended warranties. Therefore, a solution that balances
both these concerns and the prevention of transferring defaults for
existing loans to the lenders and ultimately the taxpayers would be
ideal.
To meet these goals, Congress should take a two-prong approach.
For the first prong, regarding new loans, the best solution is a defini-
tion that provides an exclusive list of elements of the transaction that
the statute will cover. This list should not include negative equity or
other add-ons for protection from cram-down. Not including these
items will reduce incentives for additional irresponsible lending. By
providing an exclusive list of elements that the provision will cover,
questions will not arise regarding whether another element, such as
extended warranties, is covered. Since this list would not include neg-
ative equity and other add-ons, it should apply only to new loans.
For the second prong, regarding existing loans, a provision spe-
cifically including negative equity will prevent debtors from cramming
down their loans and potentially passing the costs on to the taxpayer.
Including negative equity will avoid a windfall to unwise borrowers by
preventing cram-down of loans made under the expectation that the
Code would not permit it. That expectation exists because such treat-
ment more closely matches the language of the current statute, the
original congressional intent, and the treatment of negative equity by
the majority of courts. The combination of these two provisions will
achieve the proper incentives and disincentives while avoiding expos-
ing the taxpayer to greater risk on the investment in the automakers
and their finance divisions.
Relief Program. See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Plans to Lend Chrysler $1.5 Billion for Auto Loans, N.Y.





The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
made many changes to bankruptcy law. Regardless of one's position
on this legislation, the lack of consistency in the treatment of the anti-
cram-down provision is problematic. Clearly, Congress failed to ap-
preciate the scope of problems associated with the use of the term
"purchase-money security interest." As a result, courts have reached a
number of different results in applying state law. A number of these
courts have incorrectly applied the Uniform Commercial Code, and
others, in a well-intentioned effort to provide some uniformity to the
treatment of these loans, have inappropriately applied federal law to
determine the meaning of PMSI.
Congress and the courts have left lenders and borrowers with lit-
tle or no guidance regarding how bankruptcy courts will treat negative
equity in Chapter 13 cases. Whether one thinks the hanging para-
graph was an appropriate way of "restoring the foundation of secured
credit," an unnecessary provision because the foundation of secured
credit did not need restoration, or a giveaway to lenders who engage
in abusive lending practices, its result in this area is clear.1 75 Congress
has created the problem, and Congress should take the responsibility
of cleaning it up. Congress can best clean up this mess by enacting a
new provision providing a clear definition in keeping with the original
Act for loans made under the current section 1325(a) and a new rule
removing the hanging paragraph's protection for negative equity fi-
nanced in new loans. Such a rule will provide clarity and proper in-
centives for future loans and match what seems to have been the
intent of the current version.
In the mean time, courts handling cases under the current law
should apply state law. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
best answer is that negative equity is not a purchase-money obligation,
meaning that a PMSI does not secure that part of the obligation.
Rather than applying the transformation rule, courts should apply the
dual-status rule analogous to the rule for non-consumer transactions.
175 Of course, a number of articles address both the benefits and problems of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. This topic is outside of the
scope of this Note; in order to focus on the hanging paragraph and solutions to the
problems with the use of the term "purchase-money security interest," the author offers no
opinion on the subject.
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